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Abstract. Discussions of “chance” and related concepts (such as “stochasticity,” “random-
ness,” “indeterminism,” etc.) are found throughout philosophical work on evolutionary theory.
By drawing attention to three very commonly-recognized distinctions, I separate four inde-
pendent concepts falling under the broad heading of “chance”: randomness (as a property
of sequences), epistemic unpredictability, causal indeterminism, and probabilistic causal pro-
cesses. Far from a merely semantic distinction, however, it is demonstrated that conflation of
these obviously distinct notions has an important bearing on debates at the core of evolutionary
theory, particularly the debate over the interpretation of fitness, natural selection, and genetic
drift.
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1. Introduction
Our discussions of evolutionary theory are saturated with references to the
concept of “chance.” Though many instances can be found, including macroevo-
lution (Conway Morris, 2009; Desjardins, 2011), mutation (Stamos, 2001;
Dietrich, 2006; Merlin, 2010), and even topics as diverse as foraging theory
(Glymour, 2001), perhaps the most hotly debated comes from the literature
surrounding the appropriate interpretation of natural selection, fitness, and
genetic drift. In recent years, two main positions on the nature of selection
and drift have crystallized. One approach, deriving from early literature on the
propensity interpretation of fitness (Brandon, 1978; Mills and Beatty, 1979),
considers selection and drift to be probabilistic causal processes (Stephens,
2004; Ramsey, 2006; Abrams, 2009; Otsuka et al., 2011). Another approach,
which has come to be known as the “statisticalist” interpretation of evolution-
ary theory (Matthen and Ariew, 2002; Walsh et al., 2002; Ariew and Lewon-
tin, 2004; Krimbas, 2004; Walsh, 2007; Ariew and Ernst, 2009; Walsh, 2010),
claims that, rather than causal processes, selection and drift are merely statis-
tical trends, abstracted from real events in the lives and deaths of individual
organisms.
It is clear that many concepts falling under the broad heading of “chance”
are present within this debate. Fitness itself is considered probabilistically
because different organisms in different environments will have, as Darwin
noted, a differing “chance of leaving offspring” (Darwin, 1859, p. 88). Ge-
netic drift is described as “random,” often on the basis of our inability to
predict in advance, for any given population, the precise impact of genetic
drift on its evolution – Brandon calls drift a “prediction without a direc-
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2tion” (2006, p. 325). And the choice between the statisticalist and causalist
approaches seems to be one between objective and subjective notions of
“chance.”
Given this tight relationship, one would expect that there would be an
extensive literature discussing the relationship between these various notions
of chance and the interpretation of evolutionary theory. Surprisingly enough,
however, such a literature is almost entirely absent, and I hope to take the first
step toward providing this analysis here.
I will begin by laying out a set of relatively innocuous distinctions which
we may use to tease out the specific meaning of “chance” at work in a given
argument. For our purposes, I will separate four distinct “chance” concepts.
Far from being a merely semantic exercise, however, I will then turn to two
examples: one drawn from the causal-interpretation camp, and one from the
statisticalists. Both of these arguments, I claim, are dramatically undercut by
a thoroughgoing conflation of these various notions of “chance.” While the
distinctions I draw, then, are well-known, it seems that they are not well-
understood and not utilized with sufficient caution.
2. Some Concepts of “Chance”
Before I turn to clarifying some of the concepts that fall under the heading
of “chance” in the philosophy of biology literature, I should pause for several
precautionary remarks. First, I have singled out the term “chance” for no
particular reason other than its breadth. Chance is just one of a family of
concepts, all often (and unfortunately, often interchangeably) invoked in the
philosophical literature. Equally well could we frame the discussion in terms
of “randomness” in evolution, “stochasticity” in evolution, or “indetermin-
ism” in evolution, to name only a few examples. This trouble with meaning is
most certainly part of the problem – it is, in fact, quite difficult to speak with
clarity on the issue, as this entire array of terms lacks current, widely-accepted
meanings.
Second, I do not intend to offer here anything like an exhaustive “taxon-
omy” of the concept of chance (and, again, these related terms), as used in
the biological sciences. Indeed, such an exhaustive description may well be
impossible, and there is certainly no a priori reason to think that “chance”
would be the appropriate “root” for such a taxonomy. Instead, I will sepa-
rate out four notions of “chance” using three distinctions, all of which are,
I believe, widely appreciated and utilized. A mere recognition of these four
senses and the differences between them will suffice for the arguments in the
remainder of the paper.
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32.1. THREE DISTINCTIONS
2.1.1. Chance versus Randomness
The first distinction separates chance from randomness. While agreement on
the matter is not universal, as a general rule we may say that “randomness”
is a property of a sequence of outcomes, while “chance” is, in some sense,
a property of the process, device, causal system, or what-have-you, which
produces these sequences.1 This parallels usage in mathematics – much of
the mathematical literature on randomness has focused on criteria by which a
sequence may be demonstrated (as far as it is possible to do so) to be random
(Martin-Löf, 1966; Martin-Löf, 1969; Kolmogorov and Uspenskii, 1987).2
2.1.2. Subjective versus Objective Chance
On the “process” side of the prior divide, we may next separate subjective
from objective chance. Drawing from the literature on the interpretation of
probability theory, this distinction, too, has been fairly cleanly drawn in the
philosophical literature.
For our purposes, I intend to bring out only one clearly subjective notion
of chance: chance as unpredictability. The biological literature is replete with
chance in this sense, as it is the one which most directly impinges upon the bi-
ologist’s ability to execute experiments. In particular, the population genetics
literature makes extensive use of unpredictability (Roughgarden, 1979).
2.1.3. Causal Indeterminism versus Probabilistic Causal Processes
The last distinction we require, between two different possible varieties of
objective chance, is a bit more esoteric. To begin, many authors in the de-
bate – especially those supporting the propensity interpretation of fitness –
have argued that the outcome-randomness we see at the biological level re-
quires philosophical explanation in terms of probabilistic causal processes.
If individual fitness, for example, is a probabilistic cause which governs the
reproductive output of a given organism, then it is obvious that the reproduc-
tive outputs of an ensemble of identically prepared organisms will constitute
a (biased) random sequence.
On the other hand, we might think that this outcome-level randomness is
due not to probabilistic causal processes, but to genuine causal indeterminism
manifest at the macro-level. Stamos (2001), for example, has argued that
quantum-mechanical effects (which, we may assume for the sake of argu-
ment, are genuinely indeterministic in this sense) have direct effects at the
population-genetics level.3 Both Brandon and Carson (1996) and Glymour
(2001) have argued that in addition, the same kinds of concerns which cause
us to ascribe causal indeterminism to quantum mechanical processes should
lead us to believe that the same sort of indeterminism is manifested at the
evolutionary level.
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4There are therefore two different concepts of objective chance here. But
are they necessarily independent? That is, might we just argue that probabilis-
tic causal processes must be undergirded by genuine causal indeterminism,
declare these two notions of objective chance to be equivalent, and move on?4
Drawing on work by Sober (2010), I believe this claim would be mistaken.
Recall the way in which Popper originally offers support for the propen-
sity interpretation of probability. Probabilities, in his terms, are grounded
in “relational properties of the experimental arrangement” (Popper, 1959,
p. 37). Now consider the example of a coin-flipping device in an entirely
deterministic universe. Surely, if this device flips coins with some range of
initial velocity and angular momentum parameters, then there exist relational
properties of the experimental arrangement that will suffice to ground the
truth of some claim like “the probability of this coin-flipping device produc-
ing a heads-up coin is one half.” Of course, for any individual coin, we could
(if we so chose) determine with precision (probability one or zero) whether
that coin would land heads or tails. But the relational properties of the coin-
flipping experiment as a whole still stand – and they stand, it seems, even if
only one coin (or no coins at all!) is flipped by the device.
Further, there seems to be a sense in which we are justified in saying that
the device causes the coin to wind up either heads or tails. But it does not
cause one outcome or the other: rather it causes heads at a certain proba-
bility, and tails at another probability. Nor does it need to violate physical
law to do so. Rather, these macro-level probabilistic facts just are a way
of summarizing the micro-level physical facts. Such a process would be an
objective feature of the world – this would remain a valid, causal description
of the device even if there were no observers around to describe it – and it
does not depend at all on whether or not the underlying laws governing the
box are deterministic or indeterministic. Hopefully, then, we have a minimal
notion of probabilistic causal processes which both can be instantiated in an
entirely deterministic universe and makes reference to nothing particularly
metaphysically outlandish. Causal indeterminism is therefore independent of
the possible existence of probabilistic causal processes.
2.2. FOUR NOTIONS OF CHANCE
We are therefore left with four quite independent, yet related, concepts that
fall under the broad umbrella of “chance” (see figure 1). We have randomness
as applied to sequences, unpredictability (as a variety of subjective process-
chance), and causal indeterminism and probabilistic causal processes (as two
varieties of objective process-chance).
Again, it is worth reiterating that I do not intend this to be (anywhere
close to) a complete partitioning of all possible concepts which might fall
under the broad scope of “chance” (or “randomness,” or “stochasticity,” or
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5“process” chance randomness
subjective chance objective chance
causal indeterminism probabilistic causal processes



unpredictability
Figure 1. Drawing three relatively common distinctions within the broad category of “chance”
leaves us four concepts which we will use in the following (italicized).
“indeterminism,” etc.). I rather believe that it is a fairly inoffensive set of four
obviously distinct and independent notions at play in work on chance and
randomness, four notions which we can agree we ought to keep separate in
our philosophical work on “chancy” phenomena.
It is precisely this caution, then, that I hope to show has been absent from
much of the philosophy of biology literature. I will provide two examples
– one debate from the propensity interpretation of fitness literature, and one
from the statisticalist literature – which are both rendered highly problematic
due to a persistent conflation of these four distinct concepts.
3. The Propensity Interpretation of Fitness
Other than the often-repeated claim that fitness must be interpreted as a propen-
sity in order to prevent the “survival of the fittest” from coming out tau-
tologous, authors rarely discuss what exactly it is that is supposed to make
fitness and selection “chancy.” One attempt, however, to provide an answer
to this question is provided by Brandon and Carson (1996).5 They ascribe
this chanciness to the influence of genetic drift, so we should begin with their
characterization of drift.
Brandon and Carson (henceforth BC) are defenders of what might be
called the “sampling error” school of genetic drift: “we suggest,” they write,
“that genetic drift be characterized as any transgenerational (evolutionary)
change in gene or genotype frequencies due to sampling error” (1996, p.
321). For BC there exists, that is, an expected outcome – the outcome we
would predict were a given scenario governed merely by natural selection,
with offspring populations produced in proportion to fitness values. Any de-
viation from this expected outcome due to what they call “random sampling
effects” (sampling of gametes to form offspring, of survivors of a population
bottleneck, etc.) is defined as genetic drift.
Turning to selection and fitness, then, BC argue that “natural selection
is indeterministic at the population level because (in real life as opposed to
certain formal models) it is inextricably connected with drift” (1996, p. 324).
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of “indeterminacy” in the evolutionary process. It seems that they intend this
use of “indeterminacy” to refer to some sort of objective chance – they argue
that “if one is a realist...then one should conclude that [evolutionary theory]
is fundamentally indeterministic” (1996, p. 336).
Their discussion of genetic drift, however, does little to provide support
for the quite strong role they expect it to play. First, they claim that “drift
clearly is a stochastic or probabilistic or indeterministic phenomenon” (1996,
p. 324). As we have already noted, however, this is an obvious conflation:
“stochastic” generally refers to sequence-level randomness, “probabilistic”
might refer to any sense of objective chance, and “indeterministic” usually
applies only to the particular sense of causal indeterminism. What sense of
chance, then, do they consider drift to exemplify?
Deciphering a response to this question in their arguments is quite diffi-
cult. Most problematically, many of their assertions about drift are phrased
in terms of “the inferences we can make” (p. 322), or what genetic drift “can
predict” or “cannot predict” (p. 323). But turning again to our distinctions
from the last section, unpredictability is a merely epistemic notion of chance,
and while it might offer us some indication that a particular phenomenon in
nature is objectively “chancy,” there is no determinate relationship between
objective and subjective chance. We may have both objectively chancy and
highly predictable systems (such as collapse interpretations of quantum me-
chanics), or we may have non-chancy, yet highly unpredictable systems (such
as in the case of deterministic chaos (Werndl, 2009) or systems like Norton’s
dome (Norton, 2003; Malament, 2008)).
If, therefore, BC intend their argument regarding drift to support the stronger
proposition that genetic drift exhibits not merely unpredictability, but some
sort of objective chance, it has missed the mark.
They return briefly to this issue near the end of their paper, arguing that
even if events at the level of individual organisms are in fact “purely de-
terministic, the population-level generalizations are probabilistic” (p. 335)
because these generalizations are “autonomous” statistical laws, in the sense
of Hacking (1990). This argument is similar to the one I used in the last
section to separate probabilistic causal processes from causal indeterminism.
Even though population-level generalizations are grounded in events in the
lives of individual organisms, there may remain a sense in which we can say
that these higher-level generalizations are objectively probabilistic, even if
these individual-level events are not.
Two responses are particularly salient. In order to ground this inference
to the objectivity of macro-level probability ascriptions, BC appeal to Hack-
ing’s criterion of “autonomy.” This notion of autonomy should certainly not,
I argue, be used in this manner. Hacking defines autonomous statistical laws
as those which “could be used not only for the prediction of phenomena but
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7also for their explanation” (Hacking, 1990, p. 182). But what grounds the
ability of these laws to make such predictions is not described in Hacking’s
work. The criterion as it stands is under-specified, if not circular: autonomous
statistical laws are those that can explain, and the laws that can explain are,
perhaps, the autonomous ones.
It is important to note that this causes no problems for Hacking’s own
analysis. Hacking’s project is a historical one: he is searching through history
in order to locate the first time that an experimenter used a statistical law as
though it were autonomous, i.e., as though it supported explanations. Francis
Galton, Hacking argues, was the first to do so. The grounding problem is not,
therefore, Hacking’s – he is not attempting to tell us why Galton believed that
these statistical laws were able to explain, merely that he did so. It follows
that Hacking’s criterion of autonomy cannot, therefore, be used as an inde-
pendent method of sorting statistical laws into two kinds: autonomous and
non-autonomous.
Secondly, BC focus once again on prediction and explanation, which does
nothing to clarify our confusion about what sort of objective chance it really
is that BC are searching for. On Hacking’s notion of autonomy, the ability
to ground explanations clearly adds something over and above prediction, so
we have arrived at a notion of chance slightly more robust than the merely
subjective unpredictability we saw above. What exactly it is that has been
added, however, is left entirely unstated.
Let’s turn, then, to a response to BC published by Graves, Horan, and
Rosenberg (1999, henceforth GHR). As I have laid out BC’s argument, it
would seem that GHR should have much to critique, and indeed they do. They
begin by agreeing with (or, at least, accepting for the sake of argument) BC’s
characterization of drift as sampling error. They then go further, noting that
some (citing Hull (1974) and Beatty (1984)) have claimed “that the theory of
evolution is statistical precisely because of this fact” about drift.
For GHR, however, “the following question remains: Are the probabilities
employed in the theory epistemic or not?” (1999, p. 146). That is, they reit-
erate the question which we have pursued here: since it seems that BC want
to establish drift as providing some sense of chance more robust than mere
epistemic unpredictability, what exactly is this sense of chance? As I have
noted, BC provide no definition of what this might consist of, nor do they give
this position any real grounding. GHR therefore conclude that BC’s argument
“presupposes objective chanciness” (1999, p. 150, original emphasis), rather
than arguing for it. Begging the question is, GHR claim, the only manner in
which BC’s conclusion could follow from their premises.
This seems to be fairly close to a knockdown point in favor of GHR. BC
assert that genetic drift exhibits some sort of robust “indeterminacy,” then
argue not for this point but the unrelated claim that genetic drift is unpre-
dictable. But is this really the most charitable reading that we can provide of
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present in BC’s argument over the idea of chance, we can make their point
stronger (and make their argument not, or not obviously, beg the question). I
will hazard that they wish to argue that genetic drift is a theory of probabilistic
causal processes.
We may support this reading of BC’s argument in several ways. Most
importantly, Brandon’s other writings on drift are consonant with this view.
His recent work describes drift as an element of the “Zero Force Evolutionary
Law,” which states that in all evolutionary systems (with variation and hered-
ity) “there is a tendency for diversity and complexity to increase” (Brandon,
2010, p. 708). His toy model of this law consists of a particle diffusing away
from an initial position with given transition probabilities (Brandon, 2010,
p. 703). After a few iterations, we are able to specify the particle’s state only
probabilistically, by specifying the odds that the particle will be found in each
of the possible end-states.
Importantly, however, there is for Brandon a causal explanation under-
lying this diffusion process. He notes that “the drift producing potential of
the sampling processes that are constitutive of the evolutionary process is a
fundamental part of the causal structure of our world,” featuring in a special
class of causal explanations he calls “default-causal” explanations (Brandon,
2006, p. 329).
In a section titled “Drift as a Causal Concept” in his book co-authored
with Daniel McShea, they write that an important requirement in coming
to understand scientific explanation is “to develop an adequate account of
probabilistic causation that would ground such probabilistic explanations”
(McShea and Brandon, 2010, p. 106). Indeed, they seem to endorse this way
of understanding genetic drift directly when they write that
Some might think of drift as the absence of cause. But, as we see it,
the relevant causal understanding is the full set of objective probabilities
that govern the entities to be sampled. ...causal understanding is achieved
when we assemble the relevant probabilities governing the events in ques-
tion. (McShea and Brandon, 2010, p. 107)
Returning to Brandon and Carson, my reading of BC’s argument is also
supported by their peculiar reference later in the paper to arguments from
“hidden variables.” They claim that the appropriate way to overturn their
claim of indeterminacy would be to demonstrate that there were unequally
distributed hidden variables governing the evolutionary process, and then that
“assignments of relative fitnesses would be merely epistemic, merely useful
instruments given our state of ignorance of the hidden variable[s]” (Brandon
and Carson, 1996, p. 326). Initially, this argument seems quite perplexing.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the world may be approximated
reasonably well by Newtonian mechanics,6 there exists a quite obvious set of
hidden variables that would do the job: namely, the positions and momenta of
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outcomes, and our assignments of relative fitnesses (just like our assignments
of all quantities other than particle positions and momenta) would be the
result of our ignorance of these hidden variables.
So what do BC intend this argument to show? If, consonant with the read-
ing here, they are concerned with probabilistic causes as described by genetic
drift, then we may make sense of their claims. For in this case, what would
be required to prove their argument wrong would be not deterministic hidden
variables within some other theory upon which evolution depends (molecu-
lar biology, chemistry, physics, etc.).7 Rather, defeating BC here would re-
quire the existence of deterministic hidden variables within the very causal
processes of natural selection and genetic drift, driving these evolutionary
outcomes (hidden variables of which they are right to claim that we have no
evidence). To put this another way, if we can manage to keep the issue of
probabilistic causation separate from the question of causal determinism, as
I have argued in the last section, we can see that BC’s position on hidden
variables is much more explicable.
It seems, therefore, that BC conflate at least three of the notions of chance
we laid out above (unpredictability, causal determinism, and probabilistic
causation), and that only on one reading – the existence of probabilistic cau-
sation in genetic drift – can we make sense of their argument. This is, I
claim, the notion of “chance” or “indeterminacy” that BC hope to find in
evolutionary theory.
We should then return to GHR’s response. They claim that begging the
question is the only way in which BC’s conclusions might follow from their
premises.8 However, I have provided a reading on which BC’s argument con-
cerns macro-level probabilistic causal processes. Reconstructed in this way,
their hidden-variables argument is at least plausible, and their overall position
doesn’t obviously beg the question.
To return to the main theme, the tone throughout GHR makes it clear that
their primary concern is not with probabilistic causal processes, but rather
with something more like causal indeterminism (combined with some worries
regarding reduction or supervenience). They argue that “an omniscient being
would not be using probabilities at all to guess at outcomes in situations
like” genetic drift (1999, p. 151). Such an omniscient being would merely
use information from underlying theories – perhaps biochemistry or physics
– in order to predict exactly (and deterministically) what the final fate of a
population undergoing genetic drift would be. As I have noted earlier, how-
ever, this is a non sequitur – these are not the right kind of “hidden variables”
to disprove BC’s argument.
GHR’s next critique claims that BC’s conclusions would be tantamount
to proposing “ungrounded propensities of populations, causally inexplicable
by the manifest properties of organisms on which they supervene” (1999, p.
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155). But it is clear that this, too, need not follow. Probabilistic causation
may, as I have already discussed, be present even given the existence of
underlying determinism. GHR have clearly conflated unpredictability with
causal indeterminism.
We are thus in the following position: BC have conflated (at least) three
different notions of “chance” in their argument, and GHR have conflated (at
least) two in theirs. As a result, it is no longer obvious that GHR’s argument
even genuinely engages with the paper it was intended to critique. This is,
to put it mildly, a strong indication of a philosophical problem. Conflation
of the various “chance” concepts I have identified above, therefore, is quite
clearly responsible for problems in the arguments of otherwise quite careful
philosophers.
4. The Statisticalist Position and “Chance”
In their initial elucidation of what has come to be known as the “statistical-
ist” interpretation of evolutionary theory, Matthen and Ariew (2002) claim
that there exists no way, in principle (as opposed to in specific empirical
examples), to distinguish the effects of natural selection and genetic drift, if
both are considered probabilistically. One portion of this argument is phrased
in terms of the role of “chance” in various evolutionary explanations. Let’s
unpack it in detail.
In general, Matthen and Ariew (henceforth MA) aim to demonstrate that
believing, as proponents of the “causal process” notion of genetic drift do,
that natural selection and genetic drift may be separated as distinct causal in-
fluences on the evolutionary process “violates sound probabilistic thinking,”
and that it does not make sense “to say that drift is a force or, more generally,
a cause of change that acts independently of selection” (2002, pp. 62, 60).
They begin with the following example:
Consider this analogy. You toss a coin four times. What would explain the
outcome two heads? Answer: the physical setup of the coin-tossing trials.
What would explain the outcome four heads? Answer: the same thing.
Although the second result is less probable, the same setup explains both
outcomes. (Matthen and Ariew, 2002, pp. 60–61)
They go on to offer an almost identical instance of this argument as it applies
to a biological population. Consider two heterozygous populations, one of
which evolves to heterozygosity at each allele. One of these alleles, however,
is more fit than the other in the given environment. “What explains this dif-
ference” in outcome, they ask? “The answer, just as in the case of the coin,
might well be: exactly the same thing, the same positioning of the traits in the
adaptive landscape” (Matthen and Ariew, 2002, p. 61).
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The argument, therefore, seems to go something like this. We have a
particular random sequence (be it the results of a coin-tossing experiment,
or population-level evolutionary outcomes). Defenders of the causal inter-
pretation of genetic drift argue that there are two, separate influences that
determine outcomes in situations like these: genetic drift and natural selec-
tion. This amounts to the claim, however, that one could “partition the ho-
mogeneous reference class to which these trials belong by improbability or
chance,” tagging “these things [selection and drift] as ‘forces’ that occasion-
ally favor the less likely outcome” (Matthen and Ariew, 2002, p. 61). A bit
later, they provide a more detailed version of this claim:
Although it is six times more probable that two heads will turn up in a
run of four tosses of a coin than that four will, chance does not play any
more of a role in a particular run of four heads than in a particular run of
two and two. Thus, one cannot in general differentiate between individual
events on the basis of how much they are attributable to chance. (Matthen
and Ariew, 2002, p. 64)
Causal theorists of genetic drift, they argue, are in effect asking us to take
events in the lives and deaths of organisms, and divide them up into two piles:
“more chancy” (the domain of genetic drift), and “less chancy” (the domain
of natural selection). Such a division is impossible, MA argue, and given this,
the causal interpretation of genetic drift fails.
There are several ways for a causal theorist to respond to this argument.
One, taken by Pfeifer (2005), is to challenge MA on their understanding of
the probabilities at work in evolution, causing their argument to fail on its
own terms. While I think this is a worthwhile approach, it is not the one I
will take here. Rather, our discussion thus far should make one feature in
particular of this argument stand out: what is it that MA mean by “chance”
when they claim that the causal theory is committed both to the partitioning
of evolutionary events in this manner, and to the claim that “it makes sense”
in these cases “to quantify the role of chance” (2002, p. 64)?
First, we may convincingly rule out two of our already-mentioned no-
tions of “chance”: unpredictability and causal indeterminism. MA state very
explicitly that it is their intent to demonstrate that “there is, in general, no
objective, as opposed to epistemic, apportioning of causal responsibility to
selection as against drift in a concrete evolutionary history” (2002, p. 68, em-
phasis added). This statement confirms that MA are certainly not interested
in merely epistemic notions of unpredictability. They also state explicitly
that while one situation “in which the notion of probabilistic causation is
invoked” is “in quantum mechanics, where it is claimed that the interaction of
certain variables is irreducibly indeterministic...one would not be justified in
claiming that the individual events above [in the examples already mentioned]
contained elements of indeterminacy” (2002, pp. 62–63, fn.). They thus also
disavow any interest in the issue of causal indeterminism.
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What remain, then, as possible referents for MA’s use of “chance”? I
see two answers to this question, both of which indicate trouble for their
argument. First, we might read them, as we did BC’s argument earlier, as
concerned with the issue of probabilistic causation in biological systems. This
doesn’t seem right, though. For nowhere is the causal theorist of genetic drift
committed to the claim that the process of natural selection is “less chancy”
and genetic drift “more chancy” in this sense. Most problematically, I am not
certain how being a probabilistic causal process can come in degrees. Indeed,
it is often claimed that non-probabilistic causation is merely a special case of
probabilistic causation, where all probabilities are either one or zero.9 If this
is right, then the distinction between probabilistic and non-probabilistic cau-
sation is binary: either all probabilities are one or zero, or they are not. If they
are not, there can be no sense in which one process is “more probabilistic”
than another.
Further, even if there were a sense in which two causal processes could
be compared on this axis, it is not obvious that the causal theorist of drift
would be committed to the claim that drift was the “more chancy” of the two
processes. Certainly, natural selection is a biased probabilistic process – bi-
ased, of course, by organismic fitness values (if one adheres to the propensity
interpretation of fitness). But while drift lacks this precise sort of bias, it is
biased by a host of other variables, including population size as well as a host
of other environmental effects. There is no sense, then, in which drift is an
“unbiased” causal process.
Interpreting MA’s use of “chance” as probabilistic causation, despite sev-
eral indications that this is how they intend their argument to be interpreted,
fails. This leaves us, I claim, with only one notion of “chance” left: the
randomness of the outcomes of the processes of drift and selection. If we
interpret MA’s use of chance in this way, we may at least understand their
arguments: it is indeed impossible to take individual outcomes from a partic-
ular random evolutionary sequence and claim that some of these outcomes
are “more random” or “less random” than others.
This leaves MA with a different, but equally devastating problem. For
this argument does nothing whatsoever to attack the coherence of the causal-
process notion of drift and selection. Just looking at the outcomes of a par-
ticular sequence, as Millstein (2002) effectively argued in response to Beatty
(1984), tells us nothing about the processes generating those outcomes. On
the most common uses of selection and drift, she notes that “although random
drift and natural selection can be distinguished when they are conceived as
processes, they cannot be distinguished fully when conceived as outcomes”
(Millstein, 2002, p. 46).10 MA’s failure to distinguish selection and drift,
therefore, comes as no surprise, given that the only way to make sense of their
argument is to read it as attempting to distinguish the outcomes of selection
and drift.
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This points to the same philosophical trouble in which the BC/GHR debate
found itself. MA claim to be arguing against the coherence of the entire causal
view of selection and fitness, the token example of which they take to be
Sober’s force metaphor (2002, pp. 58ff ). But given the fact that they have
conflated chance in the sense of random outcomes with chance in the sense of
probabilistic causation, their argument entirely fails to engage with the view
that they claim to be opposing. Once again, conflation regarding concepts of
“chance” has caused these central arguments in the debate over the nature of
drift and selection to entirely fail to engage with one another.
5. Conclusion
I began by laying out three commonly appreciated distinctions between con-
cepts which fall under the broad heading of “chance.” This left us with four
notions of “chance” which have relatively well-understood meanings: (1)
randomness of outcomes, (2) subjective unpredictability, (3) causal indeter-
minism, and (4) probabilistic causal processes.
We have then seen two examples in which conflation of these four notions
has an important bearing on the way in which we should understand the
debate over the causal role of natural selection and genetic drift. In order for
Brandon and Carson’s argument to work, we must resolve a systematic con-
flation of three notions of chance, Graves, Horan, and Rosenberg themselves
conflate two separate notions, and Matthen and Ariew conflate a different
two distinct concepts. These widely cited arguments are undermined at least
in part by this thoroughgoing conflation.
It is certainly the case that the proper interpretation of chance and ran-
domness is a difficult philosophical problem with a long and storied history.
The same is true for the closely allied problem of the interpretation of proba-
bility. But to detect this confusion in argumentation has not required that we
resolve all the issues that come with these challenging problems. Indeed, as
I have been at pains to note, the three distinctions which we drew in order
to arrive at our four separate “chance” concepts are part of the agreed-upon
presuppositions of these philosophical debates – they are in and of themselves
relatively uncontroversial. We fail to pay attention to them, as I have shown,
at our own peril.
Notes
1 See Eagle (2011) for a discussion of both a process sense of randomness and a product
sense of chance, and the problems entailed by both.
2 For a review of this mathematical work, see Dasgupta (forthcoming).
3 Rosenberg (2001) and Davies (2004) discuss the issue as well.
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4 There is an interesting analogy here to be drawn with epiphenomenalism in the philosophy
of mind, see Shapiro and Sober (2007).
5 I can find two other attempts to solve this problem: Ramsey (2006) offers another solu-
tion, in terms of the possible lives of individual organisms, and Pfeifer (2005) ascribes the
chanciness (at least in part) to our choice to ignore certain environmental features.
6 Or, just as well for our argument, one could consider what the evolutionary process would
look like were it instantiated in a classical universe.
7 I follow Brandon and Carson’s lead in choosing the relatively innocuous “dependency” to
describe the relationship between biology and “lower-level” scientific theories like chemistry
and physics. In particular, it “is not meant to imply that biology is reducible to chemistry and
physics” (Brandon and Carson, 1996, p. 319).
8 Notably, there is more to BC’s argument than the one claim I have pointed out here, and
there is thus more to GHR’s rebuttal than simply this. On some of these other points – for
example, BC’s closing example on botanical experiments – GHR’s critiques are quite right,
and it is by no means my intent to cast doubt on those. My reconstruction of BC’s main point,
however, does not rely on that example.
9 This seems to be the position, for example, of Woodward’s analysis, on which probabilis-
tic causation is accommodated simply by extending the non-probabilistic account “to include
invariant generalizations relating the values of variables to the probability of some outcome,
or the probabilistic distribution or expectation of some variable” (2003, p. 6).
10 I should note that I do not intend to claim that there is never any way in which to separate
the empirical effects of natural selection and genetic drift – there is a large literature that would
lead one to conclude otherwise (Richardson, 2006; Millstein, 2008; Brandon and Ramsey,
2008; Millstein et al., 2009). The claim here is merely that for some arbitrary sequence of
evolutionary outcomes, it is impossible in general to claim that a given outcome is “due to
selection” or “due to drift.”
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